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Abstract—In this paper, we utilize results from convex analysis
and monotone operator theory to derive additional properties of
the softmax function that have not yet been covered in the existing
literature. In particular, we show that the softmax function is
the monotone gradient map of the log-sum-exp function. By
exploiting this connection, we show that the inverse temper-
ature parameter λ determines the Lipschitz and co-coercivity
properties of the softmax function. We then demonstrate the
usefulness of these properties through an application in game-
theoretic reinforcement learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
The softmax function is one of the most well-known func-
tions in science and engineering and has enjoyed widespread
usage in fields such as game theory [1], [2], [3], reinforcement
learning [4] and machine learning [5], [6]. From a game theory
and reinforcement learning perspective, the softmax function
maps the raw payoff or the score (or Q-value) associated
with a payoff to a mixed strategy [1], [2], [4], whereas
from the perspective of multi-class logistic regression, the
softmax function maps a vector of logits (or feature variables)
to a posterior probability distribution [5], [6]. The broader
engineering applications involving the softmax function are
numerous; interesting examples can be found in the fields of
VLSI and neuromorphic computing, see [35], [36], [37], [39].
The term “softmax” is a portmanteau of “soft” and
“argmax” [5]. The function first appeared in the work of
Luce [12], although its coinage is mostly credited to Bridle
[13]. Depending on the context in which the softmax function
appears, it also goes by the name of Boltzmann distribution
[1], [4], [34], Gibbs map [22], [46], logit map, logit choice
rule, logit response function [1], [2], [3], [19], [14], [23], [57]
or (smooth) perturbed best response function [44], [56]. The
reader should take care in distinguishing the softmax function
used in this paper from the log-sum-exp function, which is
often also referred to as the “softmax” (since the log-sum-exp
is a soft approximation of the vector-max function [7], [24]).
There are many factors contributing to the wide-spread
usage of the softmax function. In the context of reinforcement
learning, the softmax function ensures a trade-off between ex-
ploitation and exploration, in that every strategy in an agent’s
possession has a chance of being explored. Unlike some
other choice mechanisms such as -greedy [4], the usage of
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softmax selection rule1 is favorably supported by experimental
literature in game theory and reinforcement learning as a
plausible model for modeling real-life decision-making. For
instance, in [20], the authors noted that the behavior of mon-
keys during reinforcement learning experiments is consistent
with the softmax selection rule. Furthermore, the input-output
behavior of the softmax function has been compared to lateral
inhibition in biological neural networks [5]. For additional
discussions on the connections between softmax selection rule
and the neurophysiology of decision-making, see [30], [31],
[32], [33]. From the perspective of game theory, the softmax
function characterizes the so-called “logit equilibrium”, which
accounts for incomplete information and random perturbation
of the payoff during gameplay and has been noted for having
better versatility in describing the outcomes of gameplay as
compared to the Nash equilibrium [3], [14].
game
learning
rule
softmax
payoff
score
strategy
Fig. 1: High-level representation of a game-theoretic multi-agent
reinforcement learning scheme with the softmax selection rule. In
this learning scenario, the players each choose some strategy, play
the game and receive real-valued payoffs. The players then use some
learning rule to independently convert the payoffs into scores. Finally,
each player uses the softmax to select the next strategy.
Despite the intuitions that researchers have acquired with
respect to the usage of the softmax function, it is apparent
that the understanding of its mathematical properties is still
lacking. For instance, in the analysis of stateless multi-agent
reinforcement learning schemes (Figure 1), when the action
selection rule is taken as the softmax function, it is of
interest which, if any, properties of softmax can allow us
to conclude convergence of the learning algorithm towards
a solution of the game (e.g., a Nash or logit equilibrium).
Although the desired properties that can be used to conclude
such convergence are fairly mundane, virtually no reference
to these properties can be found within the existing body
of literature. With regard to applications in the context of
1In this paper, we refer to the softmax function interchangeably as the
softmax operator, softmax map, softmax choice, softmax selection rule, or
simply, the softmax.
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reinforcement and machine learning, the adjustment of the
temperature constant of the softmax function is still performed
on a rule-of-thumb basis. It has also been briefly speculated
in [42] that proper adjustment of the temperature constant can
be used for game-theoretic reinforcement learning algorithms
to achieve higher expected payoff. Therefore, an adaptive
mechanism for scheduling the temperature constant would be
desirable for many applications. Clearly, these questions can
only be affirmatively answered by uncovering new properties
of the softmax function.
The goal of this paper is to expand on the known mathe-
matical properties of the softmax function and demonstrate
how they can be utilized to conclude the convergence of
learning algorithm in a simple application of game-theoretic
reinforcement learning. For additional examples and more
involved applications, see our related paper [21]. We perform
our analysis and derive new properties by using tools from
convex analysis [7], [24] and monotone operator theory [25],
[26]. It has been known that stateless multi-agent reinforce-
ment learning that utilizes the softmax selection rule has close
connections with the field of evolutionary game theory [9],
[10], [22], [23], [54], [20], [58]. Therefore, throughout this
paper, we motivate some of the results through insights from
the field of evolutionary game theory [15], [16], [17]. It is our
hope that researchers across various disciplines can apply our
results presented here to their domain-specific problems.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section II intro-
duces notation convention for the rest of the paper. Section III
introduces the definition of the softmax function, its different
representations as well as a brief survey of several of its known
properties from the existing literature. Section IV provides the
background to convex optimization and monotone operator
theory. In Section V, we derive additional properties of the
softmax function. Section VI provides an analysis of a stateless
continuous-time score-based reinforcement learning scheme
within a single-player game setup to illustrate the application
of these properties. Section VII provides the conclusion and
some open problems for further investigation.
II. NOTATIONS
The notations used in this paper are as follows:
• The p-norm of a vector is denoted as ‖ · ‖p, 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞.
• The n − 1 dimensional unit simplex is denoted by ∆n−1,
where, ∆n−1 := {x ∈ Rn|‖x‖1 = 1, xi ≥ 0}.
• The (relative) interior of ∆n−1 is denoted by int(∆n−1),
where, int(∆n−1) := {x ∈ Rn|‖x‖1 = 1, xi > 0}.
• ei ∈ Rn denotes the ith canonical basis of Rn, e.g., ei =[
0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0
]>
, where 1 occupies the ith position.
• The vector of ones is denoted as 1 :=
[
1, . . . , 1
]>
and the
vector of zeros is denoted as 0 :=
[
0, . . . , 0
]>
.
• Matrices are denoted using bold capital letters such as A.
In general, a vector in the unconstrained space Rn will be
denoted using z, while a vector in the n− 1 dimensional unit
simplex will be denoted using x. All logarithms are assumed
to be base e.
III. REVIEW OF THE SOFTMAX FUNCTION AND ITS
KNOWN PROPERTIES
While the softmax function may take on different appear-
ances depending on the application, its base model is that of a
vector-valued function, whose individual component consists
of an exponential evaluated at an element of a vector, which
is normalized by the summation of the exponential of all the
elements of that vector. In this section, we present several well-
known and equivalent representations of the softmax function,
and review some of its properties that are either immediate
based on its definition or have been covered in the existing
literature.
A. Representations of the Softmax function
The most well-known and widely-accepted version of the
softmax function is as follows [5], [37], [40], [41], [43], [59].
Definition 1. The softmax function is given by σ : Rn →
int(∆n−1),
σ(z) :=
1
n∑
j=1
exp(λzj)
exp(λz1)...
exp(λzn)
 , λ > 0, (1)
where λ is referred to as the inverse temperature constant.
Remark 1. The softmax function is commonly presented in
the literature as the individual components of (1),
σi(z) :=
exp(λzi)
n∑
j=1
exp(λzj)
, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (2)
When λ = 1, we refer to (1) as the standard softmax
function. As λ → 0, the output of σ converges point-
wise to the center of the simplex, i.e., a uniform probability
distribution. On the other hand, as λ → ∞, the output of σ
converges point-wise to ej ∈ Rn, where j = argmax
1≤i≤n
e>i z,
provided that the difference between two or more components
of z is not too small [23], [37]. We note that elsewhere in the
literature, the reciprocal of λ is also commonly used.
Remark 2. In R2, (2) reduces to the logistic function in terms
of zi − zj ,
σi(z) =
exp(λzi)
exp(λzi) + exp(λzj)
=
1
1 + exp(−λ(zi − zj)) , j 6= i.
(3)
Furthermore, we note that (2) can be equivalently represented
as,
σi(z) = exp(λzi − log(
∑n
j=1 exp(λzj))). (4)
While (4) is seldom used as a representation of the softmax
function, in [53], the author noted that (4) represents an
exponential family, which is the solution of the replicator
dynamics of evolutionary game theory [2], [16], [17]. We will
expand on the connections between the replicator dynamics
and the softmax function in section V.
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Fig. 2: Plots of the log-sum-exp, negative entropy and both components of softmax function over R2 with λ = 1. The red curve on the
negative entropy plot is the restriction of the negative entropy over the 1-dimensional simplex, ∆1.
Another important representation of the softmax function
can be derived by considering the “argmax function” under
entropy regularization.2 Let z ∈ Rn, and consider the argmax
of x>z over the simplex,
M(z) := argmax
x∈∆n−1
x>z. (5)
When there is a unique largest element in the vector z,
it is clear that M returns the basis vector corresponding
to the entry of that element, that is, M(z) = ej , where
j = argmax
1≤i≤n
e>i z. This solution corresponds to a vertex of
the simplex. In general, however, (5) is set-valued; to see this,
simply consider the case where two or more components of z
are equal.
For many learning related applications, it is highly desirable
for M(z) to be singled-valued [22], [23], [41], [49], [50].
The most common approach to achieve this is by employing
a so-called regularizer function ψ to (5), which yields the
regularized argmax function:3
M˜(z) := argmax
x∈∆n−1
[
x>z − ψ(x)] . (6)
A common choice of the regularizer is the negative entropy
function restricted to the simplex, which under the convention
0 log(0) = 0, is given by ψ : Rn → R ∪ {+∞},
ψ(x) :=
λ−1
n∑
j=1
xj log(xj), λ > 0 x ∈ ∆n−1
+∞ x /∈ ∆n−1.
(7)
When λ = 1, we refer to (7) as the standard negative entropy
function.
Since negative entropy is λ−1-strongly convex4 in ‖ · ‖1
2As pointed out in [5, p. 182], the softmax function is a soft approximation
of the argmax function, z 7→ argmax
x∈∆n−1
x>z, not that of the “max” function.
3Depending on the context, the regularizer is also referred to as an
admissible deterministic perturbation [2, p. 189], penalty function [22], [23],
smoothing function [44] or Bregman function [48]. For detailed construction
of the regularizer, see [22], [23], [47].
4Recall that a function f is µ-strongly convex in ‖·‖p if there exists µ > 0,
s.t. f(θz+(1−θ)z′) ≤ θf(z)+(1−θ)f(z′)− µ
2
θ(1−θ)‖z−z′‖2p for all
z, z′ ∈ dom f and θ ∈ [0, 1]. f is µ-strongly concave if −f is µ-strongly
convex.
over int(∆n−1) [48], by strong concavity of the argument of
(6), it can be shown that by invoking the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
(KKT) conditions, the unique maximizer of (6) is the softmax
function evaluated at z ∈ Rn, i.e.,
argmax
x∈∆n−1
[x>z − λ−1
n∑
j=1
xj log(xj)] = σ(z). (8)
It has been noted in [20], [39], [51], [52] that the argument
of the left-hand side of (8),
x>z − λ−1
n∑
j=1
xj log(xj), (9)
represents the so called “free energy” in statistical thermo-
dynamics. In light of this connection, from a game-theoretic
perspective, the softmax function can be thought of as pro-
viding the mixed strategy with the maximum entropy which
maximizes the payoff of a game [20].
It is also worth noting that the maximum of (9) over the
simplex is by definition the Legendre-Fenchel transform of
the negative entropy function [24, p. 102], also commonly
referred to as the log-sum-exp function, which is given by
lse : Rn → R ∪ {+∞},
lse(z) := λ−1 log(
n∑
j=1
exp(λzj)), λ > 0. (10)
When λ = 1, we refer to (10) as the standard log-sum-exp
function.
It is well-known that the log-sum-exp is an approximation
to the vector-max function [7, p. 72], [24, p. 27],
vecmax(z) := max{z1, . . . , zn}.
That is, for any z ∈ Rn, vecmax(z) ≤ lse(z) ≤
vecmax(z) +λ−1 log(n), which can be shown by considering
exp(λ vecmax(z)) ≤
n∑
j=1
exp(λzj) ≤ n exp(λ vecmax(z)).
Due to this reason, the log-sum-exp is sometimes referred to
as the “softmax function” in optimization-oriented literature.
We note that the dual or convex conjugate of the log-
sum-exp function (10) is the negative entropy restricted to
the simplex, given by (7) [7, p. 93][24, p. 482][52]. We
illustrate the log-sum-exp function as well as the negative
entropy and the softmax function in Figure 2. By Fenchel-
3
Young inequality, the log-sum-exp function is bounded below
by a linear function,
lse(z) ≥ x>z − ψ(x),∀x ∈ ∆n−1, z ∈ Rn. (11)
Further consequences of the duality between the negative
entropy and the log-sum-exp function as well as its role in
game theory will not be explored at this time. Interested
readers may refer to [38], [52] or any standard textbooks on
convex analysis, for example, [7], [24], [28].
Finally, we provide a probabilistic characterization of the
softmax function. Let i, i ∈ {1, . . . , n} be independent
and identically distributed random variables with a Gumbel
distribution given by,
Pr[i ≤ c] = exp(− exp(−λc− γ)), (12)
where γ ≈ 0.57721 is the Euler-Mascheroni constant. It can
be shown that for any vector z ∈ Rn [2, p. 194][19],
Pr
[
i = argmax
1≤j≤n
zj + j
]
= σi(z). (13)
In game theory terms, (13) represents the probability of
choosing the pure strategy that maximizes the payoff or score
z ∈ Rn, after the payoff or score has been perturbed by a
stochastic perturbation.
B. Properties of the Softmax - State of the Art
We briefly comment on some properties of the softmax
function that are either immediate or have been covered in
the existing literature. First, σ maps the origin of Rn to the
barycenter of ∆n−1, that is, σ(0) = n−11. The softmax func-
tion σ is surjective but not injective, as it can easily be shown
that for any z, z+c1 ∈ Rn, ∀c ∈ R, we have σ(z+c1) = σ(z).
By definition, ‖σ(z)‖1 = σ(z)>1 = 1,∀z ∈ Rn.
In a recent paper, the authors of [43] noted that σ(P(z)) =
Pσ(z), where P is any permutation matrix, and that the
standard softmax function satisfies a type of “coordinate non-
expansiveness” property, whereby given a vector z ∈ Rn, and
suppose that zj ≥ zi, then 0 ≤ σj(z) − σi(z) ≤ 1
2
(zj − zi).
The last property can be derived by exploiting the properties of
the hyperbolic tangent function. It was also noted that these
properties of the softmax function bear similarities with the
Euclidean projection onto ∆n−1 [43].
In a direction that is tangential to the aim of this paper, the
authors of [40] is interested in finding a bound on the softmax
function. It can be shown that,
σi(z) =
exp(λzi)
n∑
j=1
exp(λzj)
≥
n∏
j=1
j 6=i
1
1 + exp(−λ(zi − zj)) , (14)
where (14) is referred as “one-vs-each” bound, which can be
generalized to bounds on arbitrary probabilities [40]. From (3),
we see that this inequality is tight for n = 2.
IV. REVIEW OF CONVEX OPTIMIZATION AND MONOTONE
OPERATOR THEORY
In this section we review some of the definitions and results
from convex optimization and monotone operator theory that
will be used in the derivation of new properties of the
softmax function. Since the following definitions are standard,
readers who are familiar with these subjects can skip this
section without any loss of continuity. Most of the proofs of
the propositions in this section can be found in references
such as [7], [24], [25], [26], [27], [28]. Throughout this
section, we assume that Rn is equipped with the standard
inner product 〈z, z′〉 :=
n∑
i=1
ziz
′
i with the induced 2-norm
‖z‖2 :=
√〈z, z〉. We assume the domain of f , dom f , is
convex. C1, C2 denote the class of continuously-differentiable
and twice continuously-differentiable functions, respectively.
Definition 2. A function f : dom f ⊆ Rn → R is convex if,
f(θz + (1− θ)z′) ≤ θf(z) + (1− θ)f(z′), (15)
for all z, z′ ∈ dom f and θ ∈ [0, 1] and strictly convex if (15)
holds strictly whenever z 6= z′ and θ ∈ (0, 1).
The convexity of a C2 function f is easily determined
through its Hessian ∇2f .
Lemma 1. Let f be C2. Then f is convex if and only if dom f
is convex and its Hessian is positive semidefinite, that is, for
all z ∈ dom f, v ∈ Rn,
v>∇2f(z)v ≥ 0, (16)
and strictly convex if ∇2f(z) is positive definite for all z ∈
dom f .
Next, we introduce the concept of a monotone operator
and its related properties. A monotone operator is usually
taken as a set-valued relation, however, it is also natural for
the definitions related to a monotone operator to be directly
applied to single-valued maps [26].
Definition 3. ([26, p. 154]) An operator (or mapping) F :
D ⊆ Rn → Rn is said to be:
• pseudo monotone on D if,
F (z′)>(z − z′) ≥ 0 =⇒ F (z)>(z − z′) ≥ 0,∀z, z′ ∈ D.
(17)
• pseudo monotone plus on D if it is pseudo monotone on D
and,
F (z′)>(z − z′) ≥ 0 and F (z)>(z − z′) = 0
=⇒ F (z) = F (z′),∀z, z′ ∈ D. (18)
• monotone on D if,
(F (z)− F (z′))>(z − z′) ≥ 0,∀z, z′ ∈ D. (19)
• monotone plus on D if it is monotone on D and,
(F (z)−F (z′))>(z−z′) = 0 =⇒ F (z) = F (z′),∀z, z′ ∈ D.
(20)
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• strictly monotone on D if,
(F (z)− F (z′))>(z − z′) > 0,∀z, z′ ∈ D, z 6= z′. (21)
Clearly, strictly monotone implies monotone plus, which
in turn implies monotone, pseudo monotone plus and pseudo
monotone. By definition, every strictly monotone operator is
an injection. We refer to an operator F as being (strictly)
anti-monotone if −F is (strictly) monotone. The following
proposition provides a natural connection between C1, convex
functions and monotone gradient maps.
Lemma 2. A C1 function f is convex if and only if
(∇f(z)−∇f(z′))>(z − z′) ≥ 0,∀z, z′ ∈ dom f, (22)
and strictly convex if and only if,
(∇f(z)−∇f(z′))>(z − z′) > 0,∀z, z′ ∈ dom f, z 6= z′.
(23)
Next, we introduce the notions of Lipschitz continuity and
co-coercivity, and show that the two concepts are related
through the gradient of a convex function.
Definition 4. An operator (or mapping) F : D ⊆ Rn → Rn
is said to be
• Lipschitz (or L-Lipschitz) if there exists a L > 0 such that,
‖F (z)− F (z′)‖2 ≤ L‖z − z′‖2,∀z, z′ ∈ D. (24)
If L = 1 in (24), then F is referred to as nonexpansive.
Otherwise, if L ∈ (0, 1), then F is referred to as contractive.
• co-coercive (or 1L -co-coercive) if there exists a L > 0 such
that,
(F (z)− F (z′)>(z − z′) ≥ 1
L
‖F (z)− F (z)′‖22,∀z, z′ ∈ D.
(25)
If L = 1 in (25), then F is referred to as firmly nonexpan-
sive.
By Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, every 1L -co-coercive oper-
ator is L-Lipschitz, in particular, every firmly nonexpansive
operator is nonexpansive. However, the reverse need not be
true, for example f(z) = −z is nonexpansive but not firmly
nonexpansive. Fortunately, the Baillon-Haddad theorem ([27,
p. 40], Theorem 3.13) provides the condition for when a L-
Lipschitz operator is also 1L -co-coercive [29].
Theorem 1. (Baillon-Haddad theorem) Let f : dom f ⊆
Rn → R be a C1, convex function on dom f and such that
∇f is L-Lipschitz continuous for some L > 0, then ∇f is
1
L
-co-coercive.
Finally, we will introduce the notion of maximal monotonic-
ity. Let H : Rn → 2Rn be the set-valued map, where 2Rn
denotes the power set of Rn. Let the graph of H be given
by graH := {(u, v) ∈ Rn × Rn|v = Hu}. The set-valued
map H is said to be monotone if (u− u′)>(v − v′) ≥ 0, v ∈
H(u), v′ ∈ H(u′).
Definition 5. ([25, p. 297]) Let H : Rn → 2Rn be monotone.
Then H is maximal monotone if there exists no monotone
operator G : Rn → 2Rn such that graG properly contains
graH , i.e., for every (u, v) ∈ Rn × Rn,
(u, v) ∈ graH ⇔ (∀(u′, v′) ∈ graH) (u− u′)>(v − v′) ≥ 0.
(26)
By Zorn’s Lemma, every monotone operator can be ex-
tended to a maximal monotone operator [24, p. 535], [25,
p. 297]. For the scope of this paper, we are interested when
a single-valued map is maximal monotone. The following
proposition provides a simple characterization of this result
[24, p. 535].
Lemma 3. If a continuous mapping F : Rn → Rn is mono-
tone, it is maximal monotone. In particular, every differentiable
monotone mapping is maximal monotone.
V. DERIVATION OF PROPERTIES OF SOFTMAX FUNCTION
In this section we derive several properties of the softmax
function using tools from convex analysis and monotone op-
erator theory introduced in the previous section. We begin by
establishing the connection between the log-sum-exp function
and the softmax function.
It has long been known that the softmax function is the
gradient map of a convex potential function [37], however,
the fact that its potential function is the log-sum-exp function
(i.e., (10)) is rarely discussed.5 We make this connection clear
with the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The softmax function is the gradient of the
log-sum-exp function, that is, σ(z) = ∇ lse(z).
Proof. Evaluating the partial derivative of lse at each compo-
nent yields
∂ lse(z)
∂zi
=
exp(λzi)∑n
j=1 exp(λzj)
. By definition of the
gradient, we have,
∇ lse(z) =

∂ lse(z)
∂z1
...
∂ lse(z)
∂zn
 = 1n∑
j=1
exp(λzj)

exp(λz1)
...
exp(λzn)
 = σ(z).
Next, we calculate the Hessian of the log-sum-exp function
(and hence the Jacobian of the softmax function).
Proposition 2. The Jacobian of the softmax function and
Hessian of the log-sum-exp function is given by:
J[σ(z)] = ∇2 lse(z) = λ(diag(σ(z))− σ(z)σ(z)>), (27)
where (27) is a symmetric positive semidefinite matrix and
satisfies J[σ(z)]1 = 0, that is, 1 is the eigenvector associated
with the zero eigenvalue of J[σ(z)].
5Although not explicitly stated, this relationship could also be found in [7,
p. 93] and various other sources.
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Proof. The diagonal entries of ∇2 lse are given by,
∂2 lse(z)
∂z2i
=
λ
[
exp(λzi)
n∑
j=1
exp(λzj)− exp(λzi)2
]
(
n∑
j=1
exp(λzj))2
,
and the off-diagonal entries of ∇2 lse are given by the mixed
partials,
∂2 lse(z)
∂zk∂zi
=
−λ exp(λzk) exp(λzi)
(
n∑
j=1
exp(λzj))2
.
Assembling the partial derivatives, we obtain the Hessian of
lse and the Jacobian of σ:
J[σ(z)] = ∇2 lse(z) = λ(diag(σ(z))− σ(z)σ(z)>). (28)
The symmetry of J[σ(z)] comes from the symmetric struc-
ture of the diagonal and outer product terms. The positive
semi-definiteness of J[σ(z)] follows from an application of
the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality [7, p. 74]. It can be shown
through direct computation that J[σ(z)]1 = 0 or alternatively
refer to [2, p. 213].
Remark 3. This result was previous noted in references such as
[37], [38] and can be found in [2, p. 195][7, p. 74]. As a trivial
consequence of Proposition 2, we can write the individual
components of J[σ(z)] as,
Jij [σ(z)] = λσi(z)(δij − σj(z)), (29)
where δij is the Kronecker delta function. This representation
is preferred for machine learning related applications and is
loosely referred to as the “derivative of the softmax” [11].
Remark 4. Using the Jacobian of the softmax function given
in (27), we provide the following important observation that
connects the field of evolutionary game theory with convex
analysis and monotone operator theory. Let x = σ(z), then
we have,
∇2 lse(z)∣∣
x=σ(z)
= λ(diag(x)− xx>). (30)
We note that this is precisely the matrix term appearing in the
replicator dynamics [2, p. 229], [45], that is,
x˙ = ∇2 lse(z)∣∣
x=σ(z)
u = λ(diag(x)− xx>)u, (31)
where x ∈ ∆n−1 is a mixed strategy and u ∈ Rn is a payoff
vector. We note that the matrix term was referred to as the
replicator operator in [56]. To the best of our knowledge, the
implications of this connection has not been discussed in the
evolutionary game theory community.
Lemma 4. The log-sum-exp function is C2, convex and not
strictly convex on Rn.
The convexity of the log-sum-exp function is well-known
[7] and follows from Proposition 2. To show that log-sum-exp
is not strictly convex, take z and z+c1, where z ∈ Rn, c ∈ R,
then,
lse(z + c1) = lse(z) + c. (32)
Thus, lse is affine along the line given by z+c1, which implies
that the log-sum-exp function is not strictly convex. This result
is also noted in [24, p. 48].
Proposition 3. The softmax function is monotone, that is,
(σ(z)− σ(z′))>(z − z′) ≥ 0,∀z, z′ ∈ Rn, (33)
and not strictly monotone on Rn.
Proof. Monotonicity of σ follows directly from the convexity
of the log-sum-exp function. Since the log-sum-exp function is
not strictly convex on Rn, therefore by Lemma 2, σ fails to be
strictly monotone. Alternatively, since every strictly monotone
operator is injective, therefore σ is not strictly monotone on
Rn.
The monotonicity of σ allows us to state a stronger result.
Corollary 1. The softmax function is a maximal monotone
operator, that is, there exists no monotone operator such that
its graph properly contains the graph of the softmax function.
Proof. This directly follows from σ being a continuous, mono-
tone map, see Lemma 3.
Next, we show that under appropriate conditions, the soft-
max function is a contraction in ‖ · ‖2.
Lemma 5. ([8, p. 58], Theorem 2.1.6) A C2, convex function
f : Rn → R has a Lipschitz continuous gradient with Lipschitz
constant L > 0 if for all z, v ∈ Rn,
0 ≤ v>∇2f(z)v ≤ L‖v‖22. (34)
Proposition 4. The softmax function is L-Lipschitz with re-
spect to ‖ · ‖2 with L = λ, that is, for all z, z′ ∈ Rn,
‖σ(z)− σ(z′)‖2 ≤ λ‖z − z′‖2, (35)
where λ is the inverse temperature constant.
Proof. Given the Hessian of lse in Proposition 2, we have for
all z, v ∈ Rn,
v>∇2 lse(z)v =λ(
n∑
i=1
v2i σi(z)− (
n∑
i=1
viσi(z))
2). (36)
Since the second term on the right hand side of (36) is
nonnegative, therefore,
v>∇2 lse(z)v ≤λ
n∑
i=1
v2i σi(z) ≤ λ sup{σi(z)}
n∑
i=1
v2i
=⇒ v>∇2 lse(z)v ≤ λ‖v‖22. (37)
where sup{σi(z)} = 1,∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n},∀z ∈ Rn. By
Lemma 4, ∇2 lse(z) is positive semidefinite. Hence using
Lemma 1 and (37), we have,
0 ≤ v>∇2 lse(z)v ≤ λ‖v‖22. (38)
By Lemma 5, σ is Lipschitz with L = λ.
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We note that Proposition 4 can also be established by using
Theorem 4.2.1. in [28, p. 240], which resorts to using duality
between the negative entropy and the log-sum-exp function.
As a minor consequence of Proposition 4, by the Cauchy-
Schwarz inequality, we have,
(σ(z)− σ(z′))>(z − z′) ≤ λ‖z − z′‖22. (39)
Corollary 2. The softmax function is 1L -co-coercive with
respect to ‖ · ‖2 with L = λ, that is, for all z, z′ ∈ Rn,
(σ(z)− σ(z′))>(z − z′) ≥ 1
λ
‖σ(z)− σ(z′)‖22, (40)
where λ is the inverse temperature constant.
Proof. Follows directly from Baillon - Haddad Theorem, see
Theorem 1.
Proposition 4 and Corollary 2 show that the inverse tem-
perature constant λ is crucial in determining the Lipschitz and
co-coercive properties of the softmax function. We summarize
these properties with respect to ‖·‖2 in the following corollary.
Corollary 3. The softmax function is λ-Lipschitz and 1λ -co-
coercive for any λ > 0, in particular,
• Nonexpansive and firmly nonexpansive for λ = 1,
• Contractive for λ ∈ (0, 1),
where λ is the inverse temperature constant.
Finally, we state an additional consequence of σ being
a Lipschitz, monotone operator with a symmetric Jacobian
matrix over all of Rn.
Corollary 4. The softmax function is monotone plus, pseudo
monotone plus and pseudo monotone on Rn.
Proof. This follows from the chain of implications in [26, p.
164].
VI. APPLICATION IN GAME-THEORETIC REINFORCEMENT
LEARNING
−U(·)
u z
σ(·) x− In ⊗
1
s+ 1
x
Fig. 3: Feedback representation of the exponentially-discounted rein-
forcement learning scheme (EXP-D-RL).
In this section we demonstrate an application of these new
properties of the softmax function in the context of stateless
continuous-time reinforcement learning in finite games. For
clarity and ease of notation, we perform our analysis in a
single-player setup. For extension to N -player games, higher-
order extension, and addition simulations, refer to our related
paper [21]. For other related work in this direction, see [22],
[23], [46].
Consider a game G with a single player. We note that type of
game is also known as “play against nature” and is identifiable
with single-population matching in population games [2]. The
player is equipped with an action set A = {1, . . . , n} and
continuous payoff function U : A → R. A mixed strategy
profile is given by x =
[
x1, . . . , xn
]> ∈ ∆n−1. The player’s
expected payoff of using x is given by,
U(x) =
∑
i∈A
xiUi(x) = x
>U(x),
where u = U(x) =
[
U1 . . . Un
]> ∈ Rn is referred to the
payoff vector at x.
Starting at t = 0, we assume that the player repeatedly
interacts with the game and aggregates his raw payoff u =
U(x) ∈ Rn into score variables (or Q-values) z ∈ Rn via the
learning rule,
zi(t) = e
−tzi(0) +
t∫
0
e−(t−τ)ui(τ)dτ,∀i ∈ A, (41)
where ui = Ui(x) ∈ R is the payoff to the ith strategy
and zi ∈ R is the score variable associated with the ith
strategy. This form of aggregation as given by (41) is known as
exponentially-discounted learning rule, under which the player
allocates exponentially more weight to recent observations of
the payoff [22], [23].
Taking the time derivative of (41) yields the score dynamics,
z˙i = ui − zi,∀i ∈ A, (42)
We refer to (42) as the exponentially-discounted score dy-
namics, a set of differential equations whose solutions capture
the evolution of the player’s scores over time. This form of
score dynamics was investigated in [20], [22], [54], [57]. Since
Ui(x) is continuous over a compact domain, therefore there ex-
ists some constant M > 0 such that |Ui(x)| ≤M, ∀x ∈ ∆n−1.
Then it can be shown using standard arguments that |zi(t)| ≤
max{|zpi (t)|,M},∀t ≥ 0 and Ω = {z ∈ Rn|‖z‖ ≤
√
nM} is
a compact, positively invariant set (solution remains in Ω for
all time).
We can express (42) using stacked-vector notation as,
z˙ = u− z, (43)
where z =
[
z1, . . . , zn
]>
. Suppose that the score variable z
is mapped to the strategy x from the softmax selection rule,
i.e., x = σ(z), then the payoff vector can be written as u =
U(x) = U(σ(z)). Expressing the composition between the
softmax selection rule with the payoff vector as U ◦ σ(z) :=
U(σ(z)), then we can also write (43) as,
z˙ = (U ◦ σ)(z)− z. (44)
The overall exponentially-discounted reinforcement learning
scheme (EXP-D-RL) can be represented as a closed-loop
feedback system in Figure 3, where In is the n × n identity
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matrix, ⊗ is the Kronecker product, and 1
s+ 1
is the transfer
function of (42) from ui to zi, s ∈ C. The closed-loop system
is equivalently represented by,
z˙ = u− z,
u = U(x),
x = σ(z).
(45)
From (44), we see that the equilibria of the overall closed-
loop system (45) are the fixed points of the map z 7→ (U ◦
σ)(z). This fixed-point condition can be restated as,
z˙ = 0 =⇒ u? = z?,
u? = U(x?),
x? = σ(z?).
(46)
The existence of the fixed point is guaranteed by the
Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem provided that U ◦ σ is a
continuous function with bounded range [57]. Since z? = u?,
therefore the fixed point z? is mapped through σ to a logit
equilibrium [14], [22].
Proposition 5. x? = σ(z?) = σ(u?) is the logit equilibrium
of the game G.
Hence, the convergence of the solution of the score dynam-
ics z(t) towards the fixed point of U◦σ implies convergence of
the induced strategy x(t) = σ(t) towards a logit equilibrium
point x∗ of the game. In the following, we provide different
assumptions on the payoff function U or the composition
between the payoff function and the softmax operator U ◦ σ
under which the induced strategy converges. For background
on dynamical systems and Lyapunov theory, see [55]. This
analysis was inspired by [57].
First, we exploit the co-coercive property of the soft-
max function to provide the convergence conditions of the
exponentially-discounted score dynamics (43) in a general
class of games. Consider the exponentially-discounted re-
inforcement learning scheme as depicted in Figure 3. We
proceed by imposing the following assumption on the payoff
of the game.
Assumption 1. The payoff U is anti-monotone, that is, for all
x, x′ ∈ ∆n−1,
(x− x′)>(U(x)− U(x′)) ≤ 0. (47)
Theorem 2. Let G be a game with player’s learning scheme
as given by EXP-D-RL, (45) (Figure 3). Assume there are a
finite number of isolated fixed-points z? of U ◦ σ, then under
Assumption 1, the player’s score z(t) converges to a rest point
z?. Moreover, x(t) = σ(z(t)) converges to a logit equilibrium
x? = σ(z?) of G.
Proof. First, recall that solutions z(t) of remain bounded and
Ω = {z ∈ Rn|‖z‖2 ≤
√
nM} is a compact, positively
invariant set. Let z? be a rest point, z? = u? = U(σ(z?)),
x? = σ(z?).
Next, consider the Lyapunov function given by the Bregman
divergence generated by the log-sum-exp function (10),
Vz?(z) = lse(z)− lse(z?)−∇ lse(z?)>(z − z?), (48)
Recall that by Lemma 4, lse is convex and by Proposition 1,
∇ lse(z) = σ(z). By convexity of lse, Vz?(z) ≥ 0,∀z ∈ Rn.
Using ‖σ(z)‖1 = σ(z)>1 = 1 and lse(z + 1c) = lse(z) + c,
it can be shown that Vz?(z? + 1c) = 0,∀c ∈ R, so Vz?(·) is
positive semidefinite, but not positive definite.
Taking the time derivative of Vz?(z) along the solution of
(44) yields,
V˙z?(z) =∇Vz?(z)>z˙
=(σ(z)− σ(z?))>(−z + u)
=(σ(z)− σ(z?))>(−z + z? − z? + u)
=− (σ(z)− σ(z?))>(z − z?) + (σ(z)− σ(z?))>(u− u?).
By Corollary 2, σ is co-coercive, therefore,
V˙z?(z) ≤− 1
λ
‖σ(z)− σ(z?)‖22 + (σ(z)− σ(z?))>(u− u?).
Since u = U(σ(z)), u? = U(σ(z?)), x = σ(z), and
x? = σ(z?), therefore (47) implies that V˙z?(z) ≤ − 1λ‖σ(z)−
σ(z?)‖22, thus V˙z?(z) ≤ 0,∀z ∈ Rn, and V˙z?(z) = 0, for all
z ∈ E = {z ∈ Ω|σ(z) = σ(z?)}. On E the dynamics of (44)
reduces to,
z˙ = U(σ(z?))− z = z? − z.
Therefore z(t) → z? as t → ∞, for any z(0) ∈ E . Thus, no
other solution except z? can stay forever in E , and the largest
invariant subset M ⊆ E consists only of equilibria. Since
(44) has a finite number of isolated equilibria z?, by LaSalle’s
invariance principle [55], it follows that for any z(0) ∈ Ω, z(t)
converges to one of them. By continuity of σ, x(t) converges
to x? = σ(z?) as t → ∞. For an alternative proof using
Barbalat’s lemma, see [21].
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Fig. 4: Convergence of the induced strategy x(t) towards the logit
equilibrium of the standard RPS game. The red curve shows the
evolution of the strategy in the interior of the simplex.
Example 1. We note that Assumption 1 is equivalent to game
G being a stable game [2, p. 79], [18]. The representative
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game from the class of stable games is the standard Rock-
Paper-Scissors (RPS) game given by the payoff matrix,
A =
 0 −1 11 0 −1
−1 1 0
 , (49)
which generates the payoff vector U(x) = Ax. We present a
simulation of the standard RPS game under the exponentially-
discounted score dynamics (43) with λ = 1. The resulting
induced strategy x(t) is shown in Figure 4, which by Theo-
rem 2 (which uses the co-coercivity property of the softmax
function) is guaranteed to converge to the logit equilibrium of
the RPS game, which is given by x? =
[
1/3 1/3 1/3
]>
.
In this game, the logit equilibrium coincides with the Nash
equilibrium.
Next, we rely on a slightly modified result in [57] to show
that the Lipschitzness of the softmax function can be directly
used to conclude the convergence of the score dynamics (43)
for certain classes of games.
Assumption 2. U◦σ is ‖·‖∞-contractive, that is, there exists a
constant L ∈ (0, 1) such that for all score variables z, z′ ∈ Rn,
‖(U ◦ σ)(z)− (U ◦ σ)(z′)‖∞ ≤ L‖z − z′‖∞. (50)
Proposition 6. (Theorem 4, [57]) Under Assumption 2, the
unique fixed point z? of U ◦σ is globally asymptotically stable
for (44). Moreover, x(t) = σ(z(t)) converges to the logit
equilibrium x? = σ(z?) of the game G.
The above proposition essentially states that the conver-
gence of the exponentially-discounted score dynamics (44)
relies on, individually, the Lipschitzness of the softmax func-
tion σ and the game’s payoff vector U . We illustrate this
dependency using the following example.
Example 2. By equivalence of norms, σ is ‖·‖∞-contractive if√
nλ < 1. Then for any game where the payoff vector U is a
‖ · ‖∞-contraction, U ◦σ is a ‖ · ‖∞-contraction. Proposition 6
implies that the induced strategy x(t) = σ(z(t)) converges to
the logit equilibrium x? ∈ ∆n−1.
VII. CONCLUSION AND OPEN PROBLEMS
In this paper we have presented a thorough analysis of
the softmax function using tools from convex analysis and
monotone operator theory. We have shown that the softmax
function is the monotone gradient map of the log-sum-exp
function and that the inverse temperature parameter λ deter-
mines the Lipschitz and co-coercivity properties of the softmax
function. These properties allow for convenient constructions
of convergence guarantees for score dynamics in general
classes of games (see [21]). We note that the structure of
the reinforcement learning scheme is similar to those that
arises in bandit and online learning (such as the Follow-
the-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) and mirror descent algorithm
[49]). We hope that researchers could adapt our results pre-
sented here and apply them to their domain-specific problems.
Finally, for many applications in reinforcement learning,
it is desirable to use a generalized version of the softmax
function given by,
σi(z) =
exp(λizi)
n∑
j=1
exp(λjzj)
, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (51)
Here, each strategy i is associated with an inverse temperature
constant λi > 0, which can be adjusted independently to
improve an agent’s learning performance. The relationship
between the individual parameters λi with the convergence
properties of score dynamics under the choice rule given
by (51) has been investigated in [57] but is not yet fully
characterized at this point. It is of interest to extend the results
presented in this paper for generalized versions of the softmax
function [60] or adopt a monotone operator theoretic approach
to analyze alternative forms of choice maps [61].
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